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The Limits of Social Choice Theory:
A Defense of the Voting Rights Act
Grant M. Hayden"
This Article presents a defense to the challenge that social choice theory presents to
voting rights. Arrows theorem, the crown jewel of social choice theory, holds that no voting
procedure that meets some minimal conditions of democratic fairness can ensure transitive,
meaningful outcomes. The theorem provides a powerful argument against the ability of any
court to devise objective vote dilution standards. Because such standards are now a necessary
element of claims under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, Arrows theorem may be viewed as a
fundamental threat to the viability of all such claims. The defense of voting rights presented in
this Article does not question the merits of the theorem (a difficult task indeed), but instead uses
the theorem, some recent (and not-so-recent) work in social choice theory, and existing voting
rights law to answer the fundamental challenge that Arrows theorem poses to voting rights
jurisprudence.
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 88
II. VOTE DILUTION JURISPRUDENCE ............................................ 90
A. Quantitative Vote Dilution .............................................. 91
B. Qualitative Vote Dilution ................................................. 94
Ill. SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY'S CHALLENGE TO VOTE
DILUTION JURISPRUDENCE ...................................................... 98
A. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem ....................................... 99
B. The Legal Implications ofArrow ' Theorem .................... 102
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION AND ITS LIMITATIONS .......................... 106
A. Spectrum Agreement .......................................................... 107
B. Further Problems ................................................................ 110
V. PARTIAL SPECTRUM AGREEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR A
MORE COMPLETE SOLUTION ....................................................... 116
A. Single-Peaked Preference Profiles ..................................... 119
1. What Does It Mean to Be Single-Peaked? ............... 119
2. What Does Single-Peakedness Imply? . . . . . . . . . 122
B. Value-Restricted Preference Profiles ................................ 123
1. What Does It Mean to Be Value-Restricted? . . . . . 123
2. The Likelihood of Value-Restricted Profiles ........... 125
C. Social Homogeneity ........................................................... 127
* Associate Professor, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A., M.A. University of
Kansas; J.D. Stanford Law School. I am grateful to Stephen Ellis and Joanna Grossman for
our many conversations on this subject. I am also grateful to the editors of the Tulane Law
Review for their careful work on this Article. Thanks as well to Jacqueline Newmark for her
research assistance.
TULANE LA W REVIEW
1. The Proportion of Single-Peaked Preferences ......... 127
2. Other Measures of Social Homogeneity .................. 128
D. Looking at Preference Profiles as a Whole ....................... 130
V I. CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 131
I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of next year, the Census Bureau will begin releasing
the results of its decennial census of the United States. The new
information will, no doubt, reveal many interesting things about the
state of the union. More importantly, and more closely related to its
central purpose, the census will provide the set of population data that
will allow our legislatures to redistribute political power by creating
new districts and redefining old ones. While the redistricting process
will produce new political winners, it will also generate political
losers, some of whom, such as racial and ethnic minorities, may need
to be protected against that traditional status through legal action. The
census and the resulting redistricting process will therefore set off a
new round of voting rights litigation which, if the last ten years is any
guide, will last well into the next decade.
The principal vehicle for bringing such districting claims is
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Section 2 allows individuals to
bring claims for vote dilution, which occurs, in the words of the Act,
when members of racial minorities "have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice."2 The guidelines for bringing
such claims are still somewhat unsettled: the statutory language is
opaque and the Supreme Court continues to struggle with basic
questions that range from standing to appropriate remedies.3 The
Court has, however, made one point exceedingly clear: those asserting
vote dilution claims must propose a standard by which to measure vote
dilution In other words, voting rights plaintiffs must demonstrate the
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
2. Id. § 1973(b).
3. For a recent Supreme Court case struggling with both standing and remedies, see
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 904-18 (1996). For a recent case dealing with remedies, see
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74,79-90, 101 (1997).
4. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997); Holder v.
Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 880-81 (1994) (plurality opinion). For a more complete discussion, see
infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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existence of an undiluted practice against which the fact of vote
dilution may be measured.'
While the process of devising vote dilution standards is fraught
with difficulties, a more serious challenge to the ability to devise vote
dilution standards has arisen from the realm of social choice theory.'
This challenge does not merely assert that one or another potential
vote dilution standard is difficult to devise, but instead insists that no
objective vote dilution standard may be devised, that vote dilution
standards are theoretically doomed from the outset.7 The source of the
theoretical obstacle is none other than the crown jewel of social choice
theory-Arrow's theorem. And the conclusion drawn is that without
an objective method of devising vote dilution standards, such claims
should not be actionable under the Voting Rights Act.9
For those who believe that minority vote dilution remains a
matter of serious concern, finding a solution to the challenge posed by
Arrow's theorem is critical. The challenge goes to the very core of the
concept of vote dilution and questions whether courts can ever
recognize or remedy such dilution. It may also interject an additional
degree of uncertainty into an area of law that the Supreme Court
already views with a great deal of trepidation. In an earlier piece, I
surveyed this problem and proposed a preliminary solution that called
for the recognition of vote dilution claims only within districts that
exhibited something loosely referred to as "spectrum agreement.' '10
That solution, however, is far from complete: The only type of
spectrum agreement that guarantees meaningful vote dilution
standards almost never exists, even in districts that can demonstrate
legally cognizable vote dilution claims. The purpose of this Article is
to explain these problems and construct a more complete defense to
this challenge posed by social choice theory.
The Article is divided into four principal Parts. Part II provides
an overview of modem voting rights jurisprudence with special
attention to the crucial role of vote dilution standards. Part III
5. A plaintiff may propose, for example, a proportional standard under which the
number of minority-majority districts in a particular state is roughly proportional to the
minority voting-age population in the state. But that type of proportional representation is
clearly not guaranteed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965,42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
6. See Grant M. Hayden, Comment, Some Implications of Arrowl1 Theorem for
Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REv. 295, 295-96 (1995).
7. See id. at 309.
8. See KENNm J. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIIMUAL VALUES 51-59 (2d ed.
1963). For a more thorough discussion of the theorem, see infra notes 64-81 and
accompanying text.




examines Arrow's theorem, its theoretical import, and its implications
for voting rights. Part IV surveys one possible solution, spectrum
agreement, and describes some of the shortcomings of the solution.
Part V, comprising the bulk of the Article, explores recent advances in
the field of social choice theory in an attempt to resolve those
shortcomings and proposes a more complete solution to the challenge
that social choice theory poses to voting rights.
I. VOTE DILUTION JURISPRUDENCE
The modem battle for minority political participation and
representation has taken place on two fronts with varying degrees of
success.. Initially, minority voters faced a battery of obstacles designed
to keep them out of the voting booth altogether. Various screening
devices, such as poll taxes and literacy tests, were administered in
ways that effectively disenfranchised minorities, especially in the
southern states." The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was, by all accounts,
very successful in eliminating those hurdles and thus securing the
rights of minorities to register and vote.'
2
Even with individual access to the ballot secured, however,
effective minority representation is often thwarted by district lines that
are either drawn or, in many cases, preserved in the face of changing
demographics, in ways that effectively "dilute" minority voting power.
This vote dilution comes in two basic forms-quantitative and
qualitative dilution.'3 Quantitative vote dilution occurs when votes are
given unequal weight in determining the outcome, and thus the power
of some votes is numerically diluted.'" Qualitative vote dilution, on
the other hand, occurs when a voter has less of an opportunity to elect
a representative of her choice despite the fact that her vote is weighed
11. See, e.g., BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUESr
FOR VOTING EQuALrIY 8-10 (1992); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN
POLrICs: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH,
1880-1910 (1974); U.S. COMM'N ON CrvIL RIGHTS, PoLrrcAL PARTICIATION: A STUDY OF
THE PARTICIPATION BY NEGROES IN THE ELECTORAL AND POLITCAL PROCESSES IN 10
SOUTHERN STATES SINCE PASSAGE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, at 19-132 (1968); C.
VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OFTHENEW SOUTH, 1877-1913, at 342-49 (1951).
12. Before the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the percentage of voting-age blacks
registered in the southern states targeted by the Act was only 29.3% (compared with 73.4%
for voting-age whites); less than two years after the passage of the Act, that number had risen
to 52.1%. See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 23 tbl.1; see also STEVEN F. LAWSON,
BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SoUTH, 1944-1969, at 330-39 (1976) (detailing the
increase in black voting following the passage of the Voting Rights Act).
13. See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic
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equally with all other votes cast.'" While the principal focus of this
Article is qualitative, not quantitative, vote dilution, the latter describes
a less complex concept, and historical attempts to identify and remedy
such dilution provide an instructive contrast to the continuing struggle
over qualitative dilution.
A. Quantitative Vote Dilution
Quantitative vote dilution occurs when a vote is numerically
diluted, which happens whenever districts are drawn in ways that
deviate from an equiproportional or "one person, one vote" standard. 6
Take, for example, a three-member governing body to be elected from
three single-member districts (Districts A, B, and C) in a county of
30,000 people. If the district lines are drawn such that District A has a
population of 5,000, District B 10,000, and District C 15,000, then
voters in District A have an obvious advantage over their neighbors in
influencing the outcome. 7 Indeed, they have double the voting power
of those in District B and triple the voting power of those in District
C.'8 Simply put, given the population disparities, a vote in District A
counts more than a vote in District B or District C.
An effective solution to quantitative vote dilution requires the
identification of a standard by which it can be measured and remedied.
The equiproportional standard for a single-member district may be
found very easily: one merely divides the total population by the
number of districts to reach the ideal number of people per district. 9
15. See id.
16. The phrase "one person, one vote" appears to have its origins in Justice William
Douglas's majority opinion in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963), where he noted:
'"The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean
only one thing-one person, one vote."
17. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-64 (1964) (providing a
general discussion of district size and relative voting power).
18. All voters in this example, of course, have the same number of votes-one each.
In a representative democracy, however, voting power must also be measured in a manner
that accounts for its republican form. That is, in order to measure an individual's voting
power, one must look at the relative indirect impact each voter has upon a particular piece of
legislation. The relative voting power of people in different-sized districts is most easily
illustrated at the extremes. If the members of a three-member goveming body were elected
from three districts, and the populations of those districts were one person, one person, and
ten million people, the political advantage to living in one of the two less populated districts
is obvious. The same is true, in a less obvious manner but nonetheless significant degree, in
the example in the text.
19. While the standard may be found relatively easily once the relevant population
data are known, there are various difficulties in arriving at the correct population figures.
Most districting is based on population counts from the decennial census which, according to
many commentators, systematically undercounts members of many minority groups. See,
1999]
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In the example above, the ideal district size is 10,000 people per
district (30,000 people divided by three districts). A comparison of the
ideal district size with the district's actual size reveals the extent of any
quantitative dilution, as deviations upward or downward from that
ideal size result in a dilution or concentration of voting power. If this
comparison reveals a significant deviation, certain adjustments,
usually involving redrawing district lines, can remedy the situation.
Viewed almost three decades after Baker v. Cart2 0 and its
immediate progeny," the twofold and threefold disparities in the
example above are now seen as easily recognizable and manifestly
unfair distributions of voting power. For many years, however, such
disparities were relatively commonplace on the state and national
political landscape. The districts at issue in Baker, for example, gave
rise to differentials in voting power of approximately 20-to-l,22 and
those in Reynolds v. Sims up to an astonishing 41-to-1 ratio.2 3 Such
disparities provided a fairly strong justification for the Supreme
Court's early forays into the political thicket of apportionment.
The Court, of course, first entered that thicket in Baker, where it
found unequal apportionment to be a justiciable constitutional claim
under the Equal Protection Clause.24  The Baker Court did not,
however, devise a substantive standard for such a claim." A short
time later, the Court devised an equiproportional or "one person, one
vote" standard for state legislative bodies in Reynolds6 and for
e.g., Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African
Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MIcH. L. REv. 1161, 1165 (1997); Samuel Issacharoff &
Allan J. Lichtman, The Census Undercount and Minority Representation: The Constitutional
Obligation of the States to Guarantee Equal Representation, 13 REv. LinG. 1, 2-13 (1993).
Indeed, the Census Bureau announced a plan to use statistical sampling in the 2000
Decennial Census to remedy the growing problem of undercounting some identifiable
groups. That plan was challenged and held invalid under the Census Act, 13 U.S.C. §§ 1-401
(1994), in Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 119 S. Ct.
765 (1999). While such data problems may also lead to a dilution of minority voting
strength, this Article focuses on other issues.
20. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394
U.S. 526 (1969); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
22. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring).
23. 377 U.S. at 545.
24. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 208-10.
25. See id.
26. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568 (holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires
each house of a bicameral state legislature to be apportioned by population). The
equiproportional standard has become so firmly entrenched in subsequent decisions that it is
one of the few claims that may be maintained under the Equal Protection Clause without a
showing of discriminatory intent. See Tucker v. Department of Commerce, 958 F.2d 1411,
1414-15 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Congress in Wesbeny v. Sanders." Since that time, the Court has
tinkered with application of the equiproportional standard. It currently
allows districts for state legislative bodies up to a 10% deviation28
from the ideal district size without justification29 and permits a greater
deviation if there is some showing that the district lines promote a state
objective such as the preservation of preexisting political boundaries."
Congressional districts, on the other hand, are increasingly held to zero
deviation from the standard district size.31
The history of the equiproportional standard and its application in
quantitative vote dilution is, of course, much more interesting and
complex than the brief account presented above.32 The most important
aspect of that history for the purpose of this Article, however, is the
27. 376 U.S. 1, 14, 17-18 (1964). The Wesberry Court applied Article 1, Section 2 of
the Constitution to the election of a congressional delegation. See id. Article 1, Section 2
provides: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. The Court held that the prescription for election "by the People"
requires that "one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as
another's." Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8. While the Wesberry decision was grounded on
Article 1, Section 2, its holding and subsequent interpretation parallels jurisprudence under
the Equal Protection Clause. See infra note 47.
28. The percentage deviation is calculated by adding the percentage excess of the
largest district over the ideal district size to the percentage deficit of the smallest district
under the ideal district size. So, for example, if the ideal district size is 10,000 people per
district, and the largest and smallest districts involved have populations of 11,500 and 8,000,
the deviation is 35%.
29. Indeed, these principles have become so firmly entrenched they now appear in
standard reference materials. See, e.g., 25 AM. JuR. 2D Elections § 25, at 820-21 (1996). The
American Jurisprudence article provides as follows:
By contrast, a maximum population deviation of more than 10[%] creates a
prima facie case of invidious discrimination and requires justification by the state
as based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state
policy. Population disparities greater than 10[%] can successfully be supported by
evidence of a rational state policy, if it is shown that:
(1) there is an absence of any built-in bias in following the policy;
(2) the policy has been consistently followed without any taint of arbitrariness
or discrimination; and
(3) population equality is the sole other criterion used in apportionments.
Id. § 25, at 821 (footnotes omitted).
30. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-25 (upholding a Virginia state
redistricting plan with a maximum percentage deviation of 16.4% on the basis of the State's
interest in preserving the integrity of political subdivision boundary lines), modified, 411 U.S.
922(1973).
31. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,731-40 (1983).
32. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Lichtman, supra note 19, at 19 (stating that "[t]here is no
basis for concluding that mathematical fidelity to ideal population distributions according to
the Census is required by the Constitution," and that, even within the one person, one vote




existence of a readily identifiable standard by which to measure such
dilution. The equiproportional standard allows courts to easily
recognize districting that results in quantitative vote dilution, quantify
the degree of that dilution, and remedy the problem. There is, in other
words, an objective, easily managed standard by which to measure and
remedy quantitative vote dilution.33
B. Qualitative Vote Dilution
With the battle to increase minority access to the voting booth
largely won, voting rights advocates turned to more invidious forms of
discrimination that limited minority representation by effectively
diluting their voting power." In many cases, for example, minority
representation was thwarted by racial gerrymanders in processes
known as "cracking" and "packing."35 As the Supreme Court noted,
"[d]ilution of racial minority group voting strength may be caused
[either] by the dispersal of blacks into districts in which they constitute
an ineffective minority of voters or from the concentration of blacks
into districts where they constitute an excessive majority."36 In either
case, a minority group may be denied the right to elect the
representative of its choice despite the fact that its individual members
cast votes that are weighed equally with those of majority voters.
The continuing problem of qualitative vote dilution gave rise to a
series of judicial and legislative responses. The first wave of attack
used section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.37 Section 5 requires the
33. Despite debates surrounding the desirability of the equiproportional standard, and
the application of that standard, most agree that one of its principal benefits is its
manageability. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Lichtman, supra note 19, at 2. Indeed, one
commentator noted that the equiproportional standard "is certainly administratable. In fact
administrability is its long suit, and the more troublesome question is what else it has to
recommend it." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDIcIAL
REvImw 121 (1980).
34. See, e.g., GROEmAN Er AL., supra note 11, at 23-24 (describing more subtle
schemes, such as at-large elections, anti-single-shot laws, reductions in the size of legislative
bodies, racial gerrymandering, and exclusive slating for reducing minority voter
participation).
35. See Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment,
in MINORrrY VoTE DiLUrION 89, 96 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984). In the former practice, a
politically cohesive minority group that is large enough to constitute a majority in a single-
member district is "cracked," or divided among various districts such that it is a majority in
none of those districts and prevented from electing a representative of its choice. See id. In
the latter, a minority group with sufficient numbers to constitute a majority in three districts
may be "packed" into two districts such that, while they make up a supermajority in those
two districts, they are able to elect only two rather than three representatives of choice. See
id.
36. Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,46 n.l 1(1986).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
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Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia to "preclear" any proposed changes to "any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting" in certain jurisdictions.38 In Allen v.
State Board of Elections, the Court applied this section to changes that
qualitatively diluted voting power as well as those that disenfranchised
minority voters, and thus provided a potent weapon to attack the more
subtle forms of discrimination.39 The use of section 5 for such
purposes, however, is limited in two respects. First, it does not apply
to the entire United States, but instead to a limited number of targeted
jurisdictions with a history of discrimination.40 Second, and more
importantly, section 5 only applies to changes in districting practices,
and thus dilutive practices that existed prior to 1964, or before a
jurisdiction's inclusion under section 5 coverage, are not subject to
challenge.4 These limitations meant that voting rights advocates often
had to look elsewhere for a means of challenging districting that
qualitatively diluted minority voting strength.
The Constitution provided the second avenue of attacking
practices that qualitatively diluted minority voting power. Beginning
38. Id.
39. 393 U.S. 544,569(1969). The Allen Court stated:
The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an
absolute prohibition on casting a ballot. Voters who are members of a racial
minority might well be in the majority in one district, but in a decided minority in
the county as a whole. [Switching from district to at-large elections] could
therefore nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their choice just as would
prohibiting some of them from voting.
Id. (citation omitted).
40. Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act describes the covered jurisdictions as those
meeting the following criteria: (1) the jurisdiction maintained a test or device as a
precondition for registering or voting as of November 1, 1964, and (2) less than 50% of the
voting-age population was registered to vote on November 1, 1964, or less than 50% of the
voting-age population voted in the November 1964 presidential election. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973b(b), 1973c (1994). The test was designed to target Southern states with a history of
discrimination, and initially covered Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Virginia, and parts of North Carolina. See Amy Snyder Weed, Note, Getting
Around the Voting Rights Act: The Supreme Court Sets the Limits of Racial Voting
Discrimination in the South, 10 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 381, 381 (1990) (stating that
"[s]ection 5 of the Act ... was intended to 'eradicat[e] the continuing effects of pastdiscrimination' in the jurisdictions covered by the Act, and 'insure that old devices for
disenfranchisement would not simply be replaced by new ones' (quoting City of Lockhart v.
United States, 460 U.S. 125, 141 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting))).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994); see also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 138
(1976) (holding that "[t]he language of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to proposed
changes in voting procedures"). The at-large seats in Beer had been part of the city's
electoral system since 1954 and were therefore not subject to review under section 5 because
the plan was a continuation of an already existing practice and not a new practice. See id. at
138-39.
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with Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court generally recognized that
vote dilution is an actionable wrong under the Equal Protection
Clause.42 Though that case focused primarily upon quantitative
dilution, the series of cases that followed, most of which focused upon
the dilutive effect of multi-member districts, made clear that
qualitative dilution claims are also actionable under the Constitution.43
Dilution claims came to be routinely analyzed under a combination of
considerations set forth by the Supreme Court in White v. Regester44
and the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen,45 collectively known as
the White/Zimmer factors. This changed, however, in 1981, when the
Supreme Court decided City ofMobile v. Bolden.4
In a highly fractured opinion, the Bolden Court held that a party
alleging qualitative vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment
must demonstrate that the questioned practice or procedure was
established or maintained with discriminatory intent.47 The Court also
applied the intent requirement to suits under the Fifteenth Amendment
and, since section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was said to add nothing
to the constitutional cause of action, to suits under section 2.4 ' This
requirement of proving discriminatory intent effectively put a halt to
qualitative vote dilution claims.
The Bolden decision set off a storm of protest that culminated in
passage of an amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.49 The
42. 377 U.S. 533,565-66 (1964).
43. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70 (1973) (holding that despite
nearly equal population among the voting districts, the multi-member districts excluded
minority participation and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause); see also Allen, 393
U.S. at 564-66 (holding that the Voting Rights Act should not only ensure that each citizen
may cast a vote, but also that the state may pass no law, however minor, that affects that
right).
44. 412 U.S. at 765-67.
45. 485 F.2d 1297, 1305-06 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sc.
Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
46. 446 U.S. 55,65-68 (1980) (plurality opinion).
47. See id. at 90 (Stevens, J., concurring). This intent requirement for voting rights
cases came on the heels of the Court's similar requirement for actions brought under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment as announced in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,238-42 (1976).
48. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60-62 (plurality opinion) (stating that section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act only elaborated on the language of the Fifteenth Amendment, thereby
incorporating the requirement of discriminatory intent).
49. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-6 (1994)). A good history of the political and
social events surrounding the 1982 amendments may be found in Peyton McCrary, The
Significance of the City of Mobile v. Bolden, in MINORiTy VOTE DmUtON, supra note 35, at
47-63. A thorough description and analysis of the legislative history of the 1982
amendments are set out in Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments
to the VotingightsAct: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347 (1983).
VOTING RIGHTS ACT
amendment effectively decoupled section 2 claims from constitutional
claims of vote dilution, and specifically did not require proof of
discriminatory intent as a prerequisite for a section 2 claim."0 In
Thornburgh v. Gingles, the Supreme Court affirmed the
constitutionality of the statute, and set out a three-part test for vote
dilution claims.5 ' Section 2 has since become the weapon of choice in
voting rights litigation.
While the concept of qualitative vote dilution now pervades
section 2 voting rights litigation, the Supreme Court has yet to
articulate an accepted definition of it. At a minimum, however, any
such definition must involve a standard against which to measure
dilution. In order to ascertain, in the words of the Voting Rights Act,
when minorities "have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice,"' one must first determine what the
outcome should look like in the absence of dilution.
Although the Court has failed to provide anything but an
operational definition of qualitative vote dilution,53 it has recently
made the need for such an underlying standard abundantly clear. The
Court explained in 1994 that "[iln a § 2 vote dilution suit, along with
determining whether the Gingles preconditions are met and whether
the totality of the circumstances supports a finding of liability, a court
must find a reasonable alternative practice as a benchmark against
which to measure the existing voting practice.5 4 As the Court further
50. See42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 to 1973bb-1 (1994).
51. 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). The three-part test for vote dilution requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate (1) the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, (2) the minority group is
politically cohesive, and (3) the majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to usually
defeat the minority's preferred candidate. See id. The test is discussed in greater detail infra
Parts IVA and VI.
52. 42U.S.C. § 1973(b)(1994).
53. A complete definition of qualitative vote dilution would include identification of
the standard against which dilution is measured. One commentator stated that the search for
a definition of vote dilution is equivalent to the search for "the ideal against which vote
dilution is identified and measured[.]" Larry Alexander, Lost in the Political Thicket, 41 FLA.
L. Ray. 563,567 (1989). The Court's use of the three Gingles factors, while providing some
indicia of qualitative dilution, do not actually define such dilution. Indeed, most of the recent
controversies in this area revolve around the failure of the courts to come up with an adequate
standard to measure dilution. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 79-85 (1997)
(recounting the extended history of the attempt by the Georgia legislature, the Justice
Department, and federal courts to decide whether Georgia should have one, two, or three
majority-minority districts).
54. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 880 (1994) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
The Holder Court correctly cited Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Gingles for this
proposition. See id. (plurality opinion). In Gingles, she noted, "[In order to decide whether
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explained in 1997, "[b]ecause the very concept of vote dilution
implies-and, indeed, necessitates-the existence of an 'undiluted'
practice against which the fact of dilution may be measured, a § 2
plaintiff must also postulate a reasonable alternative voting practice to
serve as the benchmark 'undiluted' voting practice." '55 The existence
of such a benchmark is now viewed as a necessary component of
section 2 dilution claims: "[W]here there is no objective and workable
standard for choosing a reasonable benchmark by which to evaluate a
challenged voting practice, it follows that the voting practice cannot be
challenged as dilutive under § 2.' '56
In sum, like quantitative vote dilution, qualitative vote dilution
requires, both conceptually and legally, the existence of some
objective standard against which to measure dilution. It is
conceptually required because, as Justice Scalia once noted in oral
argument, "You don't know what watered beer is unless you know
what beer is, right?"'  It is legally required because the Supreme
Court has made clear in the last few years that proof of such a standard
is a necessary element of a section 2 case, and such cases are the
principal vehicle for prosecuting qualitative vote dilution claims."8
The future viability of qualitative vote dilution claims, then, turns on
the existence and identification of these objective standards.
I. SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY'S CHALLENGE TO VOTE DILUTION
JURISPRUDENCE
Given the pivotal importance of objective standards to the
enterprise of identifying and remedying qualitative vote dilution, it
should come as no surprise that the critics of section 2 focus upon the
an electoral system has made it harder for minority voters to elect the candidates they prefer,
a court must have an idea in mind of how hard it 'should' be for minority voters to elect their
preferred candidates under an acceptable system." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 88 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
55. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997). The Bossier Parish
Court contrasted section 2 claims, which require an ideal, undiluted plan, with section 5
claims, which compare the challenged change in voting practice or procedure to the existing
plan for signs of retrogression. See id.
56. Holder, 512 U.S. at 881 (plurality opinion).
57. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (Nos.
90-757 & 90-1032).
58. Commentators have proposed various standards by which to measure qualitative
vote dilution. See, e.g., Hayden, supra note 6, at 308. In the field of minority vote dilution,
for example, some have proposed a standard of proportional representation wherein
minorities constitute the same proportion of members in a legislative body as they do in the
general population. See id. Under the Voting Rights Act, evidence of disproportionate
representation, while not dispositive, may help substantiate a vote dilution claim.
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difficulties in devising such standards." And, to be fair, those
difficulties are by no measure inconsequential. Some arise out of a
lack of complete information about voter preferences. For example,
the use of secret ballots, the fact that polling data is usually only
available for national elections, and the changing nature of voter
preferences make it quite difficult to get a fix on those preferences in
any particular jurisdiction.' Other difficulties arise when attempting
to translate voter preferences into an ideal, standard outcome. When a
hypothetical ten-district state has a 25% minority population and pure
racial bloc voting, is it better to create two majority-minority districts
or three majority-minority districts, or does the answer depend on the
geographic distribution of the minority population?61 These are the
types of questions that courts have been grappling with since the
inception of qualitative vote dilution jurisprudence, and their difficulty
may help explain, at least in part, the Supreme Court's trepidation in
the area.
While these difficulties continue to plague the courts, in the last
few years a more serious challenge to the concept of qualitative vote
dilution has been presented from the realm of social choice theory.62
That criticism argues that Arrow's theorem renders the search for
qualitative vote dilution standards not just difficult, but impossible-
theoretically doomed from the outset." Such an argument, if true,
would effectively preempt the ongoing debate about the search for
judicially manageable standards and, perhaps, explain some of the
difficulties in developing such standards. That argument is the focus
of this Part of the Article.
A. Arrow ' Impossibility Theorem
Arrow's impossibility theorem is the centerpiece of a broader
enterprise known as social choice theory. Social choice theory seeks
to describe, in some rigorous way, the translation of individual desires
59. See Larry Alexander, Still Lost in the Political Thicket (or Why I Don t
Understand the Concept of Vote Dilution), 50 VAND. L. REV. 327, 334 (1997).
60. See generally GROFmAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 82-88 (explaining the difficulty
in recognizing polarized voting).
61. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 77-90 (1997) (discussing the
legislative, executive, and judicial deliberations over whether one, two, or three of Georgia's
I 1 congressional districts should be majority black districts given that blacks constitute 27%
of Georgia's voting-age population).
62. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 334.
63. See id.
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into group choices.' More precisely, it examines social choice
functions, the mechanisms by which we move from individual
preference orders to social preference orders.6" The ideal social choice
function successfully amalgamates individual preference orders into
social preference orders, translating individual desires into group
choices. Democratic institutions have historically adopted some type
of voting procedure to handle this task.66 The adequacy of all social
choice functions was called into question in 1951, however, with the
publication of Arrow's theorem.67
Arrow demonstrated that no social choice function can
simultaneously satisfy certain conditions of fairness and logic.68 The
theorem involves four fairness conditions (nondictatorship, Pareto
efficiency, universal admissibility, and independence from irrelevant
alternatives) and one logical condition (transitivity). 69 The conditions
that a voting procedure must satisfy in order to appease Arrow's sense
of democratic fairness and logic are fairly minimal.70
64. Social choice theory's entry into the legal literature has taken place largely under
the guise of public choice theory. For two excellent summaries of the literature, see
MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY
(1997), and DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILI P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCrION (1991). Most of that literature, however, has focused more narrowly upon the
decision making of relatively small groups-legislatures and courts-as opposed to that of
the electorate at large.
65. The following definitions, largely derived from WILLAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM
AGAINST PoPuLIsM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE
THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 18, 296-97 (1982), may prove useful to the reader unfamiliar with
social choice theory. An "individual preference order" is a complete arrangement of
alternatives in order of their desirability to an individual. See id. at 18, 296. The relationship
between any two alternatives is either one of preference (P) or indifference (I). See id. Thus,
if Chris's preference order is xPyPzlw, then Chris prefers x to y, prefers y to z, and is
indifferent between z and w. See id. A "preference profile" is a "set of individual preference
orders, one for each member of society." Id. at 296. A "social preference order" is a
complete arrangement of alternatives in order of their attractiveness to society as a whole.
See id. Finally, a "social choice function" is a rule that translates a preference profile into a
social preference order. See id. at 18, 297.
66. See NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY
16(1978).
67. See ARROW, supra note 8, at 51-58.
68. See id. For a more concise outline of the proof, see PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME
THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 62-65 (1986).
69. See RmKER, supra note 65, at 116-19. Riker actually refers to six fairness
conditions. However, his additional criteria (monotonicity and citizens' sovereignty)
comprise variations of one of the four conditions. See id. Subsuming these additional
conditions into the primary four simplifies the analysis. See id.
70. For a more complete discussion of these conditions, see Hayden, supra note 6, at
297-99.
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The first condition, nondictatorship, stipulates that no single
person's preferences dictate the social preference order." One voter's
desires, then, cannot determine the outcome of an election regardless
of what others in society prefer. This condition comports with the
basic democratic intuition that society, not a dictator, should make
policy decisions.
The second condition, Pareto efficiency, is even weaker.2 It
ensures that if everyone in society prefers one alternative to another,
then the outcome of the social choice function must reproduce that
ordering. 3 If, for example, every single voter prefers candidate Gore
to candidate Bush, the condition of Pareto efficiency condemns a
voting procedure that declares Bush the winner. Like nondictatorship,
Pareto efficiency comes out of basic democratic intuitions.
The third condition, universal admissibility, demands that a social
choice function must be able to describe a social preference order for
any possible preference profile.7 4 In order to comply with this
condition, a voting procedure must work with every permutation of
voter preferences over a set of alternatives.7Y The converse of this
condition, restricting individual preference orders, runs counter to a
fundamental democratic principle: People should not be declared
ineligible to vote because of their opinions.
The fourth condition, independence from irrelevant alternatives,
requires that the introduction of new, "irrelevant" alternatives in a
preference profile does not affect the relative orderings of the other
alternatives.76 The term "irrelevant" is not pejorative; it simply refers
to an alternative outside the set of those from which a group must
choose that does not substantively alter the desirability of the other
alternatives relative to each other.
The final, logical condition of transitivity guarantees that a social
choice function will produce a complete and transitive social
preference order; that is, one in which if x is preferred to y, and y to z,
then x is also preferred to z.77 The alternative-an intransitive order in
which x is preferred to y, y to z, and z to x-is referred to as a voting
71. See id. at 297.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 298.
75. That is, the voting procedure must work for both any individual ordering and any
preference profile (combination of orderings). When choosing between x, y, and z, the
procedure must work for any combination of the six possible individual orderings (excluding
indifference): xPyPz, xPzPy, yPxPz, yPzPx, zPxPy, and zPyPx.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 299.
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cycle.78 The presence of such a cycle signals the inability of the voting
procedure to declare a winner. This inability is a fundamental flaw
given that the entire purpose of the procedure is to select an alternative
from the range of alternatives presented to the voters as the social
choice.
None of these conditions appears to impose outrageous demands
on social choice functions. Even taken together, they do not seem to
place a heavy burden on democratic voting procedures. According to
Arrow's theorem, however, simultaneous fulfillment of all the
conditions is impossible.79 Simply put, no possible voting procedure
can generate a result consistent with Arrow's five conditions. In an
earlier piece, I surveyed four social choice procedures-the Condorcet
method, amendment procedure, Borda count, and cumulative voting-
to illustrate the inevitability of Arrovian problems. 0 So long as
society preserves democratic institutions that embody the four fairness
conditions, those institutions will inevitably produce some intransitive
social preference orders. Some choices, in other words, will be always
unordered and, hence, meaningless.
B. The Legal Implications ofArrow ' Theorem
While Arrow's theorem has some obvious and profound
implications for democratic theory, it also has some less obvious
implications for our legal system. The impact of the theorem on some
legal institutions has been well explored. Specifically, many
commentators have examined our lawmaking institutions for structural
devices that diminish the possibility of intransitive, cyclical outcomes.
Some, for example, have explored legislative bodies for mechanisms
that decrease the possibility of cycling. 2 Others have assessed judicial
decision-making through the lens of social choice. 3  Strangely
enough, however, little work has been done in the field of voting
rights-a field of study that would naturally lend itself to examination
78. See id. at 306 n.57.
79. See ARROW, supra note 8, at 51-60.
80. See Hayden, supra note 6, at 299-304.
81. See RiKER, supra note 65, at 136.
82. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the
Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. Rav. 971, 997-1011 (1989); Abner J. Mikva, Symposium on the
Theory of Public Choice-Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 176-77 (1988). For an excellent
overview of the literature, see William H. Panning, Formal Models of Legislative Processes,
in HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATiVE RESEARCH 676-78, 681-82 (Gerhard Loewenberg et al. eds.,
1985).
83. See, e.g., Lewis A. Komhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
YALE L.J. 82, 97-117 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv.
L. REv. 802, 815-32 (1982).
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from a social choice perspective. Indeed, the dearth of commentary
just a few years ago led one of the principal commentators in the field
to note that he was not aware of any direct application of the insights
of Arrow's theorem to voting rights law. 4
This relative paucity of such commentary is even more surprising
in light of the fact that Arrow's theorem, on its face, provides a
powerful argument against the ability to sustain any claim of
qualitative vote dilution. The argument goes as follows: A necessary
element of any claim of qualitative vote dilution is the production of
an objective standard against which to measure and remedy that
dilution. Devising such a standard requires the use of some social
choice mechanism to translate individual voter preferences into that
ideal, standard outcome. Arrow's theorem, however, calls the viability
of all such social choice mechanisms into question. More specifically,
Arrow's theorem means that there is no objective way to move from
individual desires to a meaningful group choice without sacrificing
one of the theorem's very minimal conditions of democratic fairness.
Arrow's theorem, in other words, proves that there is no objective
method of devising qualitative vote dilution standards. Without an
objective method of finding the "correct" social outcome, courts
cannot even measure qualitative vote dilution, much less remedy it.
This argument was recently given a voice by Larry Alexander. 5
Alexander begins by differentiating a procedural conception of
democracy from a substantive conception of democracy.8 6  A
procedural conception of democracy looks, unsurprisingly, to the
procedures of democracy and relies on the principle of "one person,
one vote" and majority rule in drawing district lines.87 Such a
conception is primarily concerned with quantitative vote dilution. A
substantive conception of democracy, on the other hand, "would have
us draw district lines by reference to a set of 1olicy outcomes that
moral theory deems ideal."89 This conception is more closely allied
with qualitative vote dilution. According to Alexander, it would entail
84. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MtCH. L. REv. 1833, 1883 (1992).
85. See Alexander, supra note 53, at 570-79; Alexander, supra note 59, at 331-35.
Samuel Issacharoff has also noted that "there is a stark disjuncture between a legal doctrine
founded on the electoral preferences of racial and ethnic communities and [Arrow's
theorem,] which disputes the ability to draw any conclusions about aggregate preferences
from electoral results." Issacharoff, supra note 84, at 1883.
86. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 329-3 1.
87. See id. at 331.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 329.
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determining ideal legislation and working back to district lines
designed to achieve such legislation.90 The problem with such a
conception, however, is that "[i]n order to structure voting, we must
already know how the vote should turn out."'91 Using the terms of this
Article, the problem with quantitative vote dilution is that we must be
able to come up with an ideal standard outcome in order to draw
district lines. Alexander views Arrow's theorem as an insurmountable
obstacle to this enterprise.92
Arrow's theorem is a problem, from Alexander's point of view,
because it means that we cannot determine, given the "real world" in
which majorities shift depending on the issue or personality under
discussion, a vote dilution standard.93 More to the point, he believes
that the theorem means that there is no "outcome blind" method for
devising such standards-that all qualitative vote dilution cases are
actually "vote maldistribution" claims, and such claims necessarily
involve substantive political decisions that do not relate well to the
constitutional text and are not well suited for the judiciary.9' The
decisions do not relate to the constitutional text because the
Constitution gives no guidance on such substantive political decisions
as what sort of legislation is ideal (and, if it did, it could have just as
well included such legislation in its text).95 Furthermore, such issues
are ill-suited to the judiciary because they involve political questions.96
Alexander's argument is, essentially, a version of the straightforward
argument that Arrow's theorem eliminates the possibility of devising
objective qualitative vote dilution standards, and thus dooms any claim
of dilution that relies upon such standards. If Alexander is correct,
voting rights advocates have no foolproof way to measure vote
dilution. Since finding an ideal outcome is usually impossible,
qualitative dilution claims may ultimately lack foundation.97
90. See id. at 330-31.
91. Id. at 331.
92. See Alexander, supra note 53 at 572-76; Alexander, supra note 59, at 335-36.
93. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 332-35.
94. Seeid. at330-31.
95. See id. at 330.
96. See Alexander, supra note 53, at 578-79.
97. Of course, this is not merely a problem attendant to vote dilution; there is no
social choice function that guarantees meaningful outcomes in any election. Elections in
districts with potential vote dilution claims are just like those in any other district. And if the
outcomes of all elections are suspect, why does it matter that the standards for vote dilution
are suspect as well? In one sense, it does not matter. At some theoretical level, Arrow's
theorem dooms every democratic voting procedure's claim to credibility. In another sense,
though, it does matter. We are, and should be, much less wary of allowing state legislative
bodies to tinker with voting districts and procedures in the absence of objective standards
than we are of allowing judges to do the same thing. Legislators, we feel, may be more
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This lack of foundation is devastating for vote dilution claims
from inception to conclusion. Initially, Arrow's theorem means that
plaintiffs will be unable to assert standing in a qualitative vote dilution
case. In order for a plaintiff to have standing, she must show some
type of injury, which, in a qualitative vote dilution case, means being
the member of a minority group that has less opportunity to elect a
representative of its choice.98 That burden begs the question, "Less
opportunity than what?"--a question which, if Arrow's theorem is
correct, cannot be given a meaningful answer. Plaintiffs, then, are left
without any legitimate means of asserting standing. Or, to put it
another way, if any person has standing, every other person who is a
member of any group has an equal claim of standing to make a vote
dilution claim and, indeed, has as many claims as there are groups in
which he is a member.99
Assuming that a particular plaintiff gets past the standing stage,
she is still left in the position of having to prove dilution which, again,
entails production of an undiluted practice, or districting plan, against
which to measure that dilution. The theoretical obstacle reappears
once more at the remedy stage. Without a neutral procedural method
of identifying qualitative vote dilution, any remedy devised by courts
will actually be a substantive political decision.'0 0 Indeed, what is
more political than being able to dictate the outcome of a popular
election? In a sense, courts become dictators, usurping legislative
authority and shaping agendas and districts to achieve the social
preference orders they find most preferable. Arrovian obstacles
plague the enterprise of qualitative vote dilution from start to finish.
Thus, from the view point of social choice theorists generally and
Larry Alexander in particular, Arrow's theorem means we should
abandon the concept of qualitative vote dilution altogether.' 1
Arrow's theorem, then, provides the basis of a compelling
argument against the ability of courts to devise objective standards
against which to measure qualitative vote dilution. Such standards are
an integral conceptual component of any qualitative vote dilution
responsive and thus less likely to insulate their essentially dictatorial decisions from public
scrutiny. The 'messiness" of the legislative process may also contribute to greater stability.
See generally Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American
Politics: Perspectives of a "Reasonable Choice" Modeler, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1541, 1551-53
(1993) (commenting that the cyclicality that characterizes majoritarian decision processes
often favors the status quo).
98. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,904 (1996).
99. See Alexander, supra note 53, at 576-77.
100. Seeid. at578.
101. Seeid. at 577-79.
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claim. Perhaps even more importantly, the Supreme Court recently
held that such standards are a necessary element of any qualitative
vote dilution claim under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 2 For
voting rights advocates, these recent pronouncements of the Court and
its general trepidation in voting rights cases make the search for a
solution to the Arrovian problem even more pressing. And, as one of
those advocates, it is that task to which I now turn.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION AND ITS LIMITATIONS
There are no simple solutions to the challenge posed to voting
rights by social choice theory. Some of the more obvious potential
solutions can be readily dismissed. One potential solution or set of
solutions goes to the heart of the issue and asks whether Arrow was
wrong." 3 There may be, for example, some defect in the formal proof
of the theorem that diminishes its force or, at a minimum, renders it
unconnected to the search for qualitative vote dilution standards. But
the conditions of fairness and logicality are minimal, the proof itself
appears invulnerable,1"4 and the theorem's connection to vote dilution
claims is straightforward.
Other possible solutions involve the ability of courts to make an
end run around the hazards posed by Arrow's theorem. That is, even
if the theorem is formally correct, perhaps courts can nonetheless find
some novel way to devise objective vote dilution standards that elude
the strictures of the theorem. Unfortunately, any such standards must
explicitly or implicitly equate inputs, voter preferences, with outputs,
social choices. There simply is no secret method of amalgamating
individual preferences to determine the "true" social choice. Any
standard for evaluating social choices is vulnerable to the same
violations of one of Arrow's five conditions that it is designed to test.
Thus, solutions involving attempts to dodge the dictates of the theorem
do not take us in a fruitful direction. We must instead acknowledge
the power of Arrow's theorem and search for a solution that comes out
of the theorem itself.
Such a solution will likely have several facets. I have argued
elsewhere, for example, that limiting vote dilution claims to a few
groups at a time and paying particular attention to control of the
agenda may go a long way toward ensuring the presence of objective
102. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 875 (1994) (plurality opinion).
103. See Hayden, supra note 6, at 305.
104. See RKBR, supra note 65, at 129-36.
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dilution standards. ' A complete solution to the problem, however,
must involve a cluster of concepts loosely referred to as "spectrum
agreement."'0 6 The remainder of this Article, therefore, involves an
examination of spectrum agreement, its possible limitations, and'its
ultimate utility as a solution to the challenge to voting rights posed by
social choice theory.
4. Spectrum Agreement
Spectrum agreement occurs when all individuals in society have
a common spectrum upon which they array their preferences." 7 Such
agreement on a spectrum of alternatives should not be confused with
agreement on the ordering of those alternatives. Take, for example, a
case of complete spectrum agreement where all voters are ideologues
and array their preferences on a traditional right-left political spectrum.
If there are three candidates running for office-a conservative (c), a
liberal (/), and a moderate (m), voters will have one of four sets of
preference orders. Conservative voters will most prefer the
conservative candidate and least prefer the liberal candidate, for a
preference order of cPmPL Liberal voter tastes will run in the opposite
direction, and will thus give rise to a preference order of lPmPc.
Moderate voters will rank the candidates either mPcPl or mPlPc
depending on whether the voters are, respectively, right or left of
center. Although this assortment of political ideologues ranks the
candidates in different orders, voter preferences can be aligned along
the same right-left spectrum; no voter, for example, ranks the moderate
candidate last, as agreement on the right-left spectrum precludes such
an ordering.
Spectrum agreement is important for our purposes because it is a
sufficient condition of transitivity. When all voters arrange
alternatives oil a common spectrum, a simple majoritarian decision
procedure guarantees a transitive outcome.' Spectrum agreement,
105. See Hayden, supra note 6, at 310-13.
106. See id. at 310-17.
107. While the concept of spectrum agreement seems to imply some sort of express or
implied prearranged understanding between voters, no such understanding is required.
Instead, it is enough that voter preferences may be arrayed on a common continuum
regardless of whether those voters made any sort of agreement or, indeed, even knew that
their preferences could be arrayed on a particular spectrum.
108. See RIKER, supra note 65, at 123-28. The seminal works on the subject of
spectrum agreement are DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS
(1958) [hereinafter BLACK, CommIrrEES AND ELECTIONS], and DUNCAN BLACK & R.A.
NEWING, COMMrE DECISIONS WITH COMPLEMENTARY VALUATION (1951) [hereinafter
BLACK & NEWING, COMMITTEE DECISIONS]. For a more concise discussion, see ORDESHOOK,
supra note 68, at 160-66.
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therefore, solves the problem at hand. Simply put, courts can devise
and apply neutral vote dilution standards in districts that display
complete spectrum agreement.1"9 Given the dictates of Arrow's
theorem, however, we know that such a guarantee must come at some
cost.
Arrow's theorem, remember, holds that no voting procedure that
meets minimal conditions of democratic fairness can guarantee a
meaningful, transitive outcome. Thus, the one thing we know about
spectrum agreement is that, because it guarantees a transitive outcome,
we must be sacrificing one of those conditions. As it turns out,
reliance upon spectrum agreement to generate a transitive vote dilution
standard sacrifices the condition of unlversal admissibility. Spectrum
agreement, by definition, implies the absence of certain individual
preference orders. In the example used above, for instance, no
individual ranked the conservative, moderate, and liberal candidate in
the order cPlPm or lPcPm. The exclusion of individual preference
orders rather directly violates universal admissibility. Thus, in order to
insure a complete, transitive outcome, majoritarian social choice
procedures must violate that condition. Even naturally occurring
spectrum agreement violates universal admissibility since that
condition requires that a social choice function generates a complete
transitive outcome for any possible preference profile."'
As discussed earlier, compromising universal admissibility
jeopardizes a basic element of democratic fairness."' Natural
spectrum agreement, however, satisfies the fairness concerns
embodied by the condition of universal admissibility. In cases of
natural spectrum agreement, voters encounter no prior restraints on
their preference orders. This means that natural spectrum agreement
does not implicate the principal justification for universal
admissibility: the immorality of denying the ballot to people with
certain preference orders. Instead, cases of natural spectrum
agreement indicate situations in which individual preferences happen
to align along a common spectrum. Thus, the condition of universal
admissibility is not sacrificed by denying anyone the right to vote from
the outset, but by determining when spectrum agreement naturally
exists, thereby eliminating the possibility of intransitive results. "In
109. See Hayden, supra note 6, at 311.
110. Seeid. at311-12.




short, to sacrifice universal admissibility in a district with spectrum
agreement is to sacrifice very little.""' 2
Legislatures and courts, therefore, should primarily focus on the
qualitative vote dilution claims that arise within districts exhibiting
spectrum agreement. Spectrum agreement eliminates the risk of
intransitive outcomes and thereby permits courts to develop qualitative
vote dilution standards that do not violate Arrow's basic conditions of
fairness and logicality. "Therefore, qualitative vote dilution standards,
and the legal cases built around them, are strongest where there is
some agreement on the spectrum of alternatives."
' 3
On a practical level, courts should focus their efforts on districts
that exhibit some form of minority and majority bloc voting. Bloc
voting makes spectrum agreement more likely; both majority and
minority voters have preferences that align along some issue
spectrum." 4 For example, racial bloc voting in a district with white-
preferred candidates (w) and black-preferred candidates (b) means that
while voters have preferences like bPbPw, bPwPw, wPwPb, and
wPbPb, they do not have preferences like bPwPb or wPbPw. Bloc
voting, then, indicates the presence of a natural form of spectrum
agreement that can eliminate the possibility of intransitivities without
imposing prior restraints upon individual preferences."'  The only
difference is that here, unlike the example above, the spectrum is not a
right-left political spectrum, but a spectrum of race.
Fortunately, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act generally accords
with this prescription of Arrow's theorem. Several features of the act
and its legislative history echo the call for spectrum agreement."
6
Further, the Supreme Court's initial interpretation of section 2 in
Thornburg v. Gingles established spectrum agreement in the form of
bloc voting as a prerequisite for vote dilution."7 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, devised a three-pronged test to identify the
presence of vote dilution in multi-member districts:
These circumstances are necessary preconditions for [a violation of
section 2]. First, the minority group must be ... sufficiently large and
112. Hayden, supra note 6, at312.
113. Id. at311.
114. Again, racial spectrum agreement should not be confused with agreement upon
the candidates. With racial spectrum agreement, although white voters will prefer certain
candidates and black voters will prefer other candidates, both groups agree that the
candidates are arrayed on the same basic spectrum, with white-preferred on one side and
black-preferred on the other.
115. See Hayden, supra note 6, at 312.
116. Seeid.at314-16.
117. 478 U.S. 30,48-51 (1986).
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geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district .... Second, the minority group must be ... politically
cohesive .... Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to
defeat the minority's preferred candidate. 18
Taken together, the second and third conditions of minority and
majority bloc voting require the presence of racially polarized voting
as a precondition for any claim of vote dilution. In other words, the
Supreme Court has installed a weak version of natural spectrum
agreement as a necessary condition for proving qualitative vote
dilution without sacrificing democratic fairness. The key question
now becomes whether this version of spectrum agreement is sufficient
to sidestep the implications of Arrow's theorem.
B. Further Problems
The Arrovian problems that lurk in vote dilution jurisprudence
are not remedied by a simple trust that spectrum agreement will
guarantee transitive outcomes and thus ensure the possibility of
objective qualitative vote dilution standards. An initial problem with
that solution is that absolute spectrum agreement in the form of pure
racial bloc voting does not exist nor, of course, is it required by
Gingles. Indeed, if the Supreme Court did have such a requirement, it
would effectively eliminate legal cognizance of vote dilution claims
since no district exhibits complete racial bloc voting. There will
always be (and, perhaps, in increasing numbers) voters who cross
racial lines. Given the absence of complete spectrum agreement-the
only guarantee of transitive outcomes-the question becomes whether
the presence of partial spectrum agreement has an effect upon the
likelihood of transitive outcomes.
Even if a sufficient degree of spectrum agreement exists, there is
the further problem of whether courts can successfully identify and
measure it. That is, even if spectrum agreement exists, it may be
difficult to verify its existence. Although the question of the existence
of spectrum agreement logically precedes the question of the courts'
ability to measure it, the two questions are intertwined on a practical
level because it is impossible to discuss the existence of agreement
without discussing the limitations upon our ability to verify its
presence.'19 In any case, the principal difficulties with the solution of
118. Id. at 50-51 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
119. See generally Evelyn Elayne Shockley, Note, Voting Rights Act Section 2:
Racially Polarized Voting and the Minority Community s Representative of Choice, 89 MICH.
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spectrum agreement are whether sufficient agreement exists and, if so,
whether we can identify it with an adequate degree of certainty.
While it is relatively easy to say that racial bloc voting is required
for vote dilution claims, it is much more difficult to prove the
existence of such voting patterns. One major difficulty is the lack of
readily accessible data. Individual voting records are, of course,
secret. Reliable exit poll data is often only available for presidential
and statewide elections, which rarely involve minority candidates. 20
Voting rights proponents, then, must instead look to precinct-level,
aggregate data to prove bloc voting. There are two methods of
collecting precinct-level evidence of racial bloc voting, and both have
limitations.
First, data can be gathered from racially homogeneous precincts
to give accurate indications of racial bloc voting."2  As Grofinan
notes, "[I]f the voters in a precinct with only black residents cast
80[%] of their ballots for a black candidate and 20[%] for a white
candidate, it is obvious that that is how black voters in that precinct
L. REV. 1038, 1042-44 (1991) (noting disagreement among the members of the Gingles
Court over evidence necessary to show racial bloc voting). Shockley points out how only a
plurality of the Gingles Court agreed on which considerations should be taken into account to
determine whether racially polarized voting exists. See id. at 1042. For example, Justice
Brennan argued that "the existence of racial bloc voting should be determined based on the
facts of the case, in terms of how strong a correlation exists between the voters' race and the
candidate they support, regardless of the candidate's race." Id. at 1043. However, Justice
White disagreed with this approach arguing that "party politics and interest group politics
can, in certain instances, produce electoral results that would look like racial bloc voting, as
Justice Brennan defines it." Id. In part, the confusion surrounding racial bloc voting depends
upon whether the courts focus on the race of the candidate. "The level of importance
assigned to the candidate's race determines whether a court will consider all elections under
the challenged districting scheme as relevant evidence of the presence or absence of racial
bloc voting, or only those elections in which a minority candidate ran." Id. at 1044.
120. See GROFmAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 84, 146 n.6. Exit poll data, when
available, is usually viewed as some of the best information regarding voters' race and
preferences.
121. See id. at 85; see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 52-54, 61 (approving the district
court's reliance on two basic statistical techniques: homogeneous precinct analysis and
bivariate ecological regression); Cuthair v. Montezuma-Cortez, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1168 (D.
Colo. 1998) (stating that homogeneous precinct analysis is the 'standard in the literature for
the analysis of racially polarized voting' and [is] expressly relied upon and approved by the
Court in Gingles" (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n.20)); Barnett v. City of Chicago, 969 F.
Supp. 1359, 1414 (N.D. Ili. 1997) (stating that "[w]hile lay testimony is instructive for the
presentation of anecdotal evidence of minority cohesiveness or racial bloc voting, statistical
evidence in the form of ecological regression analysis and extreme case analysis [such as
homogeneous precinct analysis] ... is also typically offered"), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 141 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998); Reed v. Town of Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843, 852
(E.D.N.Y 1996) (noting that homogeneous precinct analysis "assumes that the voting
patterns or party affiliations of a particular racially homogeneous election district are likely to
be a fair indicator of the ethnic group's voting pattern or party affiliation more generally").
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voted."'22 There are, however, several drawbacks to this approach.
Initially, absolutely racially homogenous precincts are rare."'
Although data from predominantly homogenous precincts (say, 90%
to 95%) is valuable, its usefulness is diluted to the extent of its lack of
homogeneity. 4 Further, minorities in racially homogeneous precincts
may vote differently from those in more heterogeneous precincts. 25
Given the limitations of data from racially homogeneous districts,
parties in voting rights cases often turn to a second method of
measuring bloc voting.
The second method of measuring the degree of racial bloc voting
involves a statistical method known as "ecological regression."'26
Ecological regression compares the number of votes received by
minority candidates in each precinct to the racial composition of the
precinct.'27 Statistical correlations can then be drawn from the sum of
the data from each precinct in the district at issue.'28 While this
method does not require homogeneous precincts, it does have several
drawbacks. First, different voter turnout rates for different races may
122. GROFMANErAL.,Supra note 11, at 85.
123. See id. For one of the rare cases of abundant homogeneous precinct data, see
Cuthair, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (stating that "[t]he homogeneous precinct analysis is
particularly compelling and reliable in this case since virtually all the precincts from [the]
elections were homogeneous").
124. See generally Barnett, 969 F. Supp. at 1415 (stating that "[w]hile conceptually
simple, this analytic method is of limited applicability, because it is of questionable accuracy
in districts which are less than 90% homogenous"); Reed, 914 F. Supp. at 852 (noting that
"[o]nly election districts where the race or ethnicity of the voting age population is at least
90% homogenous should typically be subjected to extreme case analysis").
125. See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 85. The differences in voter preferences,
which may occur for a variety of political, economic, or social reasons, mean that the results
from homogeneous precinct analysis are often compared to those from ecological regression
analysis. See, e.g., Barnett, 969 F Supp. at 1415 (noting that homogeneous precinct analysis
is "frequently used as a cross checking device in conjunction with regression analysis by
verifying how accurately the regression curves predict actual voter behavior in homogenous
wards").
126. See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 85-88; see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 30,
52-54 (detailing the analysis used to determine racial bloc voting); Reed, 914 F. Supp. at 851
("Ecological regression analysis is the standard technique used to infer voting behavior
among distinct population groups.").
127. See GROFMANET AL., supra note 11, at 84-88.
128. For the exact methodology, see id. at 86-88. This methodology is used because
of the obvious difficulties of interviewing every voter and then classifying them by race and
preferred candidate. See, e.g., Reed, 914 F. Supp. at 851 ("Regression analysis allows the
parties to surmount [the] proof-gathering burden by making reasonably accurate estimates of
majority and minority voting behavior from demographic data and, depending on whether
voting in a specific election or party affiliation is being estimated, election returns and party
registration data, respectively.").
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overestimate or underestimate the degree of bloc voting.'29 This is
because voter-race data is only provided by census data, and precinct
voting records provide no direct measure of the number of members of
a particular race that votes (although advocates have tried counting
Hispanic surnames in some precincts). 3 ° Second, it is often difficult
to match census blocks (the minimum quantum of census data) to
precincts. 3 Precincts can cut across census blocks, and even when a
precinct and census block are coextensive, superior map-reading skills
are often essential to parse out race ratios.'32 Third, a variety of
potential statistical problems can plague the processing of the data.'33
The second major difficulty in proving racial bloc voting is one
of interpretation.'34 Once subject to heated debate, standard methods
of interpreting the data are now set in the courtroom. 3 Indeed, the
Gingles Court adopted a general notion of statistical significance of the
ecological regressions, making it part of the case law.3 6  But some
129. See GROFmAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 93; see also Overton v. City of Austin,
871 F.2d 529, 539 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining that when computing regression analysis,
it is necessary to estimate both the racial makeup of a district and the voter turnouts within
that district).
130. See GROFMANET AL., supra note 11, at 93-94.
131. Seeid. at94.
132. See id
133. See, e.g., id. at 98-103; see also Barnett v. City of Chicago, 969 F. Supp. 1359,
1414 (N.D. Il. 1997) (noting that "while ecological regression analysis has become a
preferred tool to assist courts in divining voter behavior, it is hardly perfect and must not be
accepted uncritically [since the methodology] is susceptible to subtle manipulation ... [and]
errors due to the 'ecological fallacy' of attributing the average behavior of voters in a given
area to all voters in that area"), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 141 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.
1998).
134. See David D. O'Donnell, Wading into the "Serbonian Bog" of Vote Dilution
Claims Under Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Making the Way Towards a
PrincipledApproach to "'Racially Polarized Voting", 65 MIss. L.J. 345, 364 (1995) ('The
efforts of the lower courts to apply the Gingles evidentiary framework to minority vote
dilution claims is marked largely by inconsistency in the evaluation of the expert statistical
evidence presented in support of the.. . 'racial bloc voting' inquiries .... ).
135. See GROFMAN Er AL., supra note 11, at 82, 84-85; see also O'Donnell, supra note
134, at 362 (noting that the Gingles Court approved a statistical methodology that "included a
consideration of the existence and strength of any 'correlation' between the race of the voter
and the selection of certain candidates, whether the revealed correlation was 'statistically
significant,' and whether the differences in minority and majority electorate voting patterns
[were] 'substantively significant"' (footnotes omitted)).
136. See Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,53 n.22; see also GROFmAN Er AL., supra
note 11, at 84 (stating that the Court "accepted Grofinan's judgment about the statistical
significance of the correlation coefficients obtained in ecological regressions"); O'Donnell,
supra note 134, at 364 ("Most lower court decisions engaged in the racial bloc voting inquiry
have failed to include any analysis of the causes of white or majority voter behavior and
instead, pointing to Gingles, focused their analysis exclusively on the results of the presented
bivariate [ecological] regression and extreme case analysis statistics."). For examples of the
use of bivariate regression and statistical significance, see NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls,
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detractors remain, and lower courts have been known to accept less
reliable methods.137
Because there is rarely, if ever, complete spectrum agreement,
and because voter preference data is never completely accurate, the
relationship between lesser degrees of spectrum agreement and
transitive outcomes becomes pressing. For if a great deal of spectrum
agreement is needed to drive down the probability of a voting cycle,
then either a low degree of such agreement or a low degree of
measurement precision in qualitative vote dilution cases may be
sufficient to thwart attempts to devise meaningful vote dilution
standards. If, on the other hand, very little spectrum agreement is
needed to ensure transitive results, then high degrees of bloc voting
and measurement precision are unnecessary. The second and third
elements of the Gingles three-part test, after all, require evidence of
racially polarized voting-a weak form of spectrum agreement.138
Unfortunately, the Gingles Court did not quantify the degree of
racially polarized voting necessary to establish a section 2 claim.
65 F.3d 1002, 1008-09 (2d Cir. 1995); Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1409-11,
1416-17 (9th Cir. 1988); Campos v. City ofBaytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244-49 (5th Cir. 1988).
137. See GROEmAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 103-04 (noting that the accuracy of the
Gingles methodology has been questioned by both statisticians and social scientists acting as
expert witnesses). The Gingles Court refused to articulate a "simple doctrinal test for the
existence of legally significant racial bloc voting" because the degree of such block voting
that is "cognizable as an element of a § 2 vote dilution claim will vary according to a variety
of factual circumstances." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57-58. Thus, as one commentator noted, "In
establishing racial bloc voting as the key element ... but in failing to provide a precise
definition of it or an evidentiary standard for proving its presence, ... Justice Brennan
succeeded only in creating a new test for lower courts to follow, without providing definitive
guidance for its implementation." Mary J. Kosterlitz, Note, Thomburg v. Gingles: The
Supreme Court's New Test for Analyzing Minority Vote Dilution, 36 CAT. U. L. R.Ev. 53 1,
562 (1987). As a result, lower courts have taken a number of different approaches in
implementing the Gingles three-part test. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488, 1493-95
(10th Cir. 1989) (stating that the race of the candidate is relevant and holding that competent
lay testimony can be used to establish polarized voting); Campos, 840 E2d at 1245-49
(holding that a candidate's race must be considered in a racial bloc voting analysis); City of
Carrollton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1558-59 (11th Cir. 1987)
(using the candidate's race in evaluating the level of racial bloc voting without
acknowledging its use); Cuthair v. Montezuma-Cortez, 7 F Supp. 2d 1152, 1169 (D. Colo.
1998) (stating that "[ajlthough an adequate statistical analysis was presented in this case... a
court should rely on other totality of the circumstances to determine if the electoral system
has a discriminatory effect").
138. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text. Both the second and third
prongs of the Gingles test require courts to consider the voting behavior of different races.
The second prong differs from the third, however, in that the former merely asks whether
voters of the same race vote alike and the latter evaluates the more complicated issue of
whether a bloc-voting majority can routinely outvote the minority such that the minority's
ability to elect a representative of its choice is impaired. See generally Johnson v. DeGrandy,




Instead, the Court explained that bloc voting must reach a certain level,
one in which the ability of a minority group to elect representatives of
its choice is impaired to a "legally significant" degree.139 That factor,
in turn, is measured on a sliding scale based on the district and a
variety of other circumstances, and may emerge more distinctly over a
period of time."4 Given the number of variables at play in the bloc-
voting determination, it is no wonder that, in the time since Gingles,
neither the Supreme Court nor any of the circuit courts of appeals has
really settled upon a threshold level of majority or minority bloc
voting.
The failure of the courts to establish such a threshold level of
polarized voting may be due to the fact that voting rights cases are
fairly complicated factual matters analyzed under a flexible standard.
Courts are often asked to look at multiple elections over several years
involving different candidates with shifting voter loyalties.14 And the
complications involved in analyzing the extent of majority and
minority bloc voting as part of the initial three-part test are only
multiplied when courts engage in the second part of the inquiry-an
examination whether, based on the totality of the circumstances,
minorities have been denied an equal opportunity to participate and
elect representatives of their choice.142 Finally, because the presence
of racially polarized voting patterns is reviewed only for clear error, 43
opinions of reviewing courts merely set relatively extreme upper and
lower limits to judicially cognizable bloc voting.
That said, the Supreme Court has provided some guidance on the
issue. InAbrams v. Johnson, for example, the Court upheld the district
court finding of failure to prove legally cognizable racial bloc
voting.' 4 The district court had found that the average percentage of
whites voting for black candidates ranged from 22% to 38%, and the
average percentage of blacks voting for white candidates ranged from
20% to 23%. 145 In other words, it was not a clear error for the trial
court to find that the second and third prongs of the Gingles test were
not fulfilled by 62% to 78% majority bloc voting and 77% to 80%
minority bloc voting. For the Supreme Court, these numbers were not
139. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56.
140. See id. at 56-57.
141. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74,92-95 (1997).
142. See, e.g., id. at 91-95.
143. See id. at 95.
144. See id. at91-95.
145. See id. at 92.
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high enough; a higher percentage of racial bloc voting was necessary
to overturn the lower court's holding as clearly erroneous.'
46
In sum, the formation of objective qualitative vote dilution
standards is theoretically impossible in light of Arrow's theorem. The
obstacles posed by the theorem, however, may be overcome when
voter preferences can be arrayed on a common spectrum. The
Supreme Court, in Gingles, mandated that section 2 plaintiffs prove a
version of spectrum agreement in the form of racial bloc voting.147
But in Gingles and, more recently, in Abrams, the Court did not and,
indeed, could not, require 100% racial bloc voting, or pure spectrum
agreement, as a prerequisite to qualitative vote dilution claims; instead,
the Supreme Court and lower courts seem to require only about 70%
to 80% bloc voting. This makes the identification of the exact degree
of spectrum agreement necessary to guarantee transitive outcomes
crucial to ensuring the presence of meaningful vote dilution standards.
The remainder of this Article, therefore, concentrates on this problem,
analyzing the precise relationship between spectrum agreement and
transitive social preference orders.
V. PARTIAL SPECTRUM AGREEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR A MORE
COMPLETE SOLUTION
As described above, the theoretical difficulties described by
Arrow's theorem are unavoidable. Democratic decision procedures
inevitably force a choice between universal admissibility and one of
the other conditions of fairness or logicality. On a more practical level,
however, faith in democratic choice procedures may not be wholly
misplaced. The difficulties described by Arrow's theorem are
alleviated if preference profiles that lead to intransitive social
preference orders never occur in the real world. More to the point, the
difficulties in finding qualitative vote dilution standards are resolved if
such profiles do not occur in districts whose members have potential
dilution claims. The practical impact of Arrow's theorem, then,
depends upon how often preference profiles prone to intransitivities, or
voting cycles, actually occur.
The probability that a given preference profile will result in an
intransitive social preference order depends, of course, on the
probability assumptions made about the composition of that profile. 48
146. Seeid. at93.
147. See Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,51 (1986).
148. See Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F. Weisberg, A Mathematical Solution for the
Probability of the Paradox of Voting, 13 BEHAV. Sl. 317, 321 (1968).
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Most early researchers started from the neutral assumption that all
individual preference orders were equally likely to occur in a profile.
49
Under this assumption, a substantial proportion of preference profiles
result in cycles. In the set of all possible profiles with three voters and
three alternatives, 5.56% produce voting cycles."' 0 Both the number of
voters and the number of alternatives positively affect the incidence of
intransitivities."' For example, with three alternatives, as the number
of voters increases, the incidence of cycling approaches a limit of
8.77%.' s2 Intransitivities increase even more rapidly as a function of
the number of alternatives. 53 With three voters, for example, as the
number of alternatives increases, the incidence of cycling approaches
100%.154 As a result, in a large election with as few as six alternatives,
almost one-third of the possible preference profiles produce
intransitive outcomes. 5 It would seem, therefore, that Arrow's
theorem actually describes a significant practical problem in the search
for meaningful vote dilution standards.
Empirical observations across a wide range of applications,
however, have failed to discover the large number of predicted
intransitivities.'56 The disparity could be the result of undetected
cycles.'57 This is especially probable when we lack access to reliable
data about preference orders, since in most democratic choice
procedures, there is no way to work backward from result to
preference profile. But even when reliable data about complete
preference profiles is available, few real-world profiles produce
intransitive results.'58 Thus, there is a real discrepancy between the
actual and predicted incidence of cycling. In a world with elections
involving millions of voters and hundreds of alternatives, the question
149. See id.
150. Seeid. at 322 tbl.2.
151. Seeid. at 321-23.
152. See id. at 322 tbl.2.
153. Seeid. at 322-23.
154. See RKER, supra note 65, at 122 tbl.5-1.
155. See Niemi & Weisberg, supra note 148, at 322 & tbl.2.
156. See generally Scott L. Feld & Bernard Grofman, Partial Single-Peakedness: An
Extension and Clarification, 51 PuB. CHOICE 71, 71 (1986) (noting that "empirical
observations of a wide variety of actual collective decisionmaking processes indicate that
cyclical majorities are very rare"); Grofian, supra note 97, at 1553 (stating that "[c]ycles are
much harder to find than early Social Choice models suggest they ought to be").
157. See Feld & Grofman, supra note 156, at 71-72; Grofman, supra note 97, at 1554,
1559-62.
158. And those that do are often suspected to be the result of strategic voting. See
Grofman, supra note 97, at 1553 n.41.
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becomes, as recently framed by Bernard Grofman: 'Why so few
observed cycles?"
159
One answer is that factors beyond the number of voters and
alternatives help minimize the frequency of cycling. The predicted
number of cycles is based on an assumption of the equal likelihood of
any preference ordering in a given profile.16 Absent this assumption,
of course, the predicted incidence of cycling varies tremendously.
Certain types of preference profiles always produce transitive results.
For example, a preference profile in which every individual has
exactly the same preference order guarantees the absence of cycles,
and the social preference order is identical to the orders in the
profile.' The fact that a profile contains only identical preference
orders, then, constitutes a sufficient condition of transitivity. Given the
unlikelihood that a large number of people (or even two or three)
completely agree on the ordering of multiple alternatives, the inquiry
becomes whether there are other conditions that increase the
probability of transitivity.
Several types of profiles that exhibit some type of spectrum
agreement help ensure that a simple majority decision produces a
transitive social preference order. This Part of the Article focuses
upon three such categories: single-peaked profiles, value-restricted
profiles, and socially homogeneous profiles. The example above in
which every individual had identical orderings falls into all three
categories: it is single-peaked, value-restricted, and perfectly socially
homogeneous. Unfortunately, such an agreement only exists in the
minds of utopian game theorists (and, perhaps, Utah), so it is of little
use. Thus, we need to further explore the three types of profiles that
increase the likelihood of acyclic outcomes. 62
159. Id. at 1553.
160. And, as discussed above, a social choice function must be able to produce
transitive results with any possible preference profile to avoid violating the condition of
universal admissibility.
161. See RncER, supra note 65, at 124.
162. Much of the following analysis will make use of examples with three
alternatives, or triples. This is no accident, nor is it opportunistic hand-waving. Amartya Sen
proved that if, among a set of alternatives, every possible triple within that set yields a
transitive result, then the same holds for the entire set of alternatives. See Amartya Y. Sen, A
Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions, 34 ECONOMmERICA 491, 492 (1966). Thus the




A. Single-Peaked Preference Profiles
1. What Does It Mean to Be Single-Peaked?
Duncan Black was the first to recognize that if a certain profile
was, in his terms, "single-peaked," it always produces a transitive
outcome.163 The description "single-peaked" comes from a graphic
description of profiles (or the orderings in profiles). Consider first an
individual preference order. An individual has a single-peaked
preference order if he has a most desired alternative, and prefers other
alternatives less as they are further from his ideal point.1" Take, for
example, Darren's individual preference order yPxPz. Placing his
order on a graph, with desirability on the vertical axis and the





Darren's preferences with respect to this horizontal axis are single-
peaked: He prefers y the most, and prefers x and z less as they are
further from his ideal point y."6'
163. See BLACK, COMMmTEES AND ELEcTIONS, supra note 108, at 19-25; BLAK &
NEWiNG, COMMrrrEE. DECISIONS, supra note 108, at 19-28; Duncan Black On the Rationale
of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. EcoN. 23 (1948).
164. See Black supra note 163, at 24; Scott L. Feld & Bernard Grofrnan, Ideological
Consistency as a Collective Phenomenon, 82 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 773, 775 (1988).
165. There are two caveats to this analysis. First, within such a representation, no
significance attaches to the distance between any two points: Single-peakedness is a property
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One can imagine a profile with respect to the horizontal axis






Here, Joanna most prefers x, but does not prefer the other alternatives
less as they are fuirther fr'om x; instead, her preference curve goes
down to y and then back up to z. Of course, on other possible
horizontal axes, such as (x z y), Joanna's preferences are single-peaked.
And, indeed, any individual preference order is single-peaked on a
graph whose horizontal axis places alternatives in the order of
desirability to that individual. Why, then, is not every social
preference profile single-peaked and thus capable of producing
transitive outcomes?
The catch is that for a preference profile to be single-peaked, it is
insufficient that there be any arbitrary way for each individual order to
be single-peaked."' 6 Instead, there must exist one horizontal ordering
such that every one of the individual orders in the profile is single-
peaked."' 7 Preference orders, in other words, must A align upon a
of a set of orderings, not utility functions. Second, this analysis can also apply to ordering
with indifference. In that case, the highest point on the preference curve would not be
peaked, but trncated, or plateaued. But single-peaked or single-plateaued, the consequences
for ensuring transitive outcomes is the same. See AmARTVA K. SEN, COLLEcTIVE CHOICE
AND SOCLWELFARE 168 (1970).




single dimension. Take, for example, the following profile with three





This profile is single-peaked because it can be arrayed on a horizontal
axis (such as (x y z), among others) such that each of the individual
orders gives rise to a single-peaked preference curve:
Figure 3
Alternatives
Voter 1 Voter 2
------------- Voter 3
When each individual's ordering is single-peaked along some ordering
on the horizontal axis, it may be said that they agree on the spectrum
of alternatives. Voters may array candidates for office, for example,
along a traditional left-right political spectrum; although all voters do
not agree on which candidate is the best, the fact that their preferences
are arrayed on a common spectrum is important. And determining the
existence of a common spectrum on which every preference order is




2. What Does Single-Peakedness Imply?
When a profile is single-peaked, the outcome of a simple
majority vote is guaranteed to be transitive.'68 Preference profiles that
are, analogously, single-caved or polarized are also guaranteed to yield
transitive results. 69 The winner of a simple majority decision
procedure with a single-peaked profile will inevitably be the ideal
point of the median voter, and the same is analogously true if all the
individuals in a given profile have single-caved or polarized
preference orders.170






This profile, when arrayed along horizontal ordering (x y z), yields the
following graph:
168. Duncan Black was the first to demonstrate this result. See Black, supra note 163,
at 30. A good modem summary can be found in RIKER, supra note 65; at 123-28.
169. See SEN, supra note 165, at 168; Feld & Grofman, supra note 164, at 776. Since
the same conditions and results hold true for single-caved and polarized preferences as for
single-peaked preferences, this discussion focuses on the latter.
170. See BLACK, Commnrra AND ELECTiONS, supra note 108, at 126-29; see also
Feld & Grofrnan, supra note 164, at 776 (concluding that "[w]hen all individuals have single-
peaked preference orderings ... the majority choice is consistent with all of the requirements









Voter I Voter 2
............. Voter 3
Profile P2, as can be seen, is not single-peaked with reference todimension (x y z). But more importantly, there is no dimension or
spectrum upon which the individual orders of P2 can be arrayed such
that each is single-peaked (or single-caved or polarized)."' The same
can be said for any profile that produces intransitivities. Single-
peakedness, it turns out, is a sufficient condition of transitivity.
B. Value-Restricted Preference Profiles
1. What Does It Mean to Be Value-Restricted?
A second, related sufficient condition of transitivity is that a
profile be value-restricted. A triple of alternatives is value-restricted if
there is at least one alternative that is either not first, not middle, or not
last in every individual's ordering of the triple.172 As discussed above,
if this property holds for every triple among a set of alternatives, then
it holds for the entire set of alternatives. 73 And, if a preference profile
is value-restricted in this way, it will always produce a transitive social
preference order. 74
Consider, for example, the situation discussed earlier in this
Article of an election with three candidates: a conservative (c), a
171. SeeBlack, supranote 163, at32-33.
172. See Sen, supra note 162, at492-93.




moderate (m), and a liberal (0.175 Although voters may not support the
same candidate, the profile may be value-restricted in that there is one
candidate, m, that all voters agree is not the worst. Conservative voters
would have a preference order of cPmPl, liberal voters lPmPc, and
moderates either mPlPc or mPcPL In no case is candidate m the least-
preferred alternative. The social preference order is, therefore,
guaranteed to be transitive.
So far, the concept of value restrictiveness seems to add little to
the analysis since, as in the simple example above, many profiles that
are value-restricted are also single-peaked. Indeed, whenever a triple
is value-restricted such that one alternative is not worst, that triple is
also single-peaked. Similarly, when one alternative is not best, the
triple is single-caved, and when one is not in the middle, the triple is
polarized. So what does the concept of value restrictiveness add to the
single-peaked analysis?
Value restrictiveness provides an additional sufficient condition
of transitivity in that certain profiles that are not entirely single-peaked,
single-caved, or polarized, may still be value-restricted and produce a
transitive outcome. For example, there are profiles that are value-
restricted even though not all of the triples are single-peaked, single-
caved, or polarized. Consider the following profile with four voters








Each of the four possible triples are value-restricted: (w, x, y) is single-
peaked since x is not the worse; (x, y, z) is single-caved since y is not
the best; (w, x, z) is single-peaked since x is not the worse; and (w, y, z)
is both polarized since w is not in the middle and single-caved since y
is not the best.' Thus, even though the profile as a whole is not
single-peaked (or single-caved or polarized), the fact that each of the
triples within the profile is value-restricted in some way guarantees a
175. This example was discussed in Hayden, supra note 6, at 306.
176. This example was discussed in Sen, supra note 162, at 498.
177. See id.
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transitive outcome. Here, majority decision procedures yield the
transitive social preference order xIzPyPw. 7
The concept of value restrictiveness, then, both expands upon and
encompasses the idea of single-peakedness. Every single-peaked
profile is value-restricted (though not all value-restricted profiles, as
seen above, are single-peaked). The import of this concept, however,
is that it describes rather large groups of profiles that guarantee
transitive outcomes. If real-world preferences regularly fell into such
patterns, social preference orders would be acyclic, and there would be
little to worry about.
2. The Likelihood of Value-Restricted Profiles
Political and sociological conditions suggest that some degree of
spectrum agreement exists in most societies. All democracies require
a degree of consensus as a precondition to formation; absent some
agreement, no social contract would exist.'79 Moreover, common
socialization may shape individual perceptions of the spectrum of
alternatives, producing the type of value restrictiveness that prevents
cycles. 8
0
Unfortunately, the condition that a profile be value-restricted is,
itself, extremely restrictive. In order to guarantee a transitive outcome,
every individual's preference order must be value-restricted.18 If even
one voter does not agree on the spectrum, there can be a cycle. To
demonstrate this, consider the following preference order with
seventeen voters and three alternatives:8 2
P4
8 Voters: xyz
5 Voters: y z x
4 Voters: zyx
178. See id.
179. See FROHLCH & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 66, at 19-20.
180. See id. at 20; see also BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERr Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL
PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF TRENDS IN AMERICANS' PouCY PREFERENCES 14 (1992) (arguing
that the collective policy preferences of the American public are coherent and stable).
181. See generally Feld & Grofian, supra note 156, at 72-73 (noting that "if even one
individual has non-single-peaked preferences then there can be a paradox of cyclical
majorities"); Richard G. Niemi, Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality,
63 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 488, 488 (1969) (stating that "the preference ordering of every
individual must be single-peaked" for "majority voting [to] yield a transitive social ordering
of the alternatives').
182. This example was discussed in Feld & Grofman, supra note 164, at 775-76.
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A quick glance at this profile tells us that it is value-restricted in
several ways. The profile is single-peaked, for example, since y is
never last. Thus, a transitive outcome is guaranteed. Of the seventeen
voters, a majority of thirteen prefery over z; a majority of nine prefery
over x; and a majority of nine prefer z over x. The outcome of
majoritarian decision procedures is the transitive social orderyPzPx.
Suppose, however, that one of the voters with preference order
zPyPx changed his order to zPxPy. In that case, there would still be
majorities that preferred y to z and z to x, but there would now also be
a majority of nine that preferred x to y. The outcome of a majority
vote is now the cycle yPzPxPy. Thus, even though sixteen of the
seventeen voters have single-peaked preferences, a majority vote still
produces an intransitive outcome.
Thus, while some preference profiles may be value-restricted,
such a condition is still extremely limiting.!8 3 As Gerald H. Kramer
explained, "[T]he various equilibrium conditions for majority rule are
incompatible with even a very modest degree of heterogeneity of
tastes, and for most purposes are probably not significantly less
restrictive than the extreme condition of complete unanimity of
individual preferences.1 84
There are several reasons to believe that such unanimity on the
spectrum does not exist in the real world. In some cases, voters may
prefer either of two extremes to a more middling position. Voters
disappointed in an inert centrist government may, for example, prefer
both conservative and liberal platforms over moderate proposals. And
indeed, empirical data suggest that most voters in the Uhited States do
not make choices along a standard left-right ideological spectrum. 5
The likelihood of achieving spectrum agreement further declines
when the array of alternatives is comprised of candidates instead of
discrete issues. Since candidates take positions on many different
issues, single-issue voters will make spectrum agreement unlikely as
voters exhibit different profiles according to their particular issue
preference." 6 Thus, the fact that we make decisions on multiple
dimensions renders complete spectrum agreement unlikely as well.
There are some additional, more pedestrian reasons that make
complete spectrum agreement unlikely. There may be a lack of
183. See Joseph Greenberg, Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of
Alternatives, 47 ECONOMETRICA 627, 627 (1979).
184. Gerald H. Kramer, On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule, 41
ECONOMETuCA 285, 285 (1973).
185. See Feld & Grofrnan, supra note 164, at 773.
186. SeeNierri, supranote 181, at488.
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information or misperceptions about the alternatives."8 7  Some
alternatives may be very similar.188 Finally, voter error may preclude
the occurrence of complete spectrum agreement.'89
In practice, then, social choice procedures will encounter
preference profiles that contain groups of voters who lack agreement
on the spectrum of alternatives. Without complete spectrum
agreement, the validity of social preference orders remains uncertain.
The degree of that uncertainty, however, varies with several other
factors, a topic taken up in the next two subparts.
C. Social Homogeneity
Fortunately, the likelihood of transitive outcomes does not wholly
depend upon assurances of complete spectrum agreement. Lesser
degrees of voter homogeneity may, in certain cases, be sufficient.
Ascertaining the degree of social homogeneity and its effect on
outcomes has been explored in two principal ways: (1) measuring
how the proportion of single-peaked individual preference orders in a
given profile affects the likelihood of transitive outcomes and
(2) measuring how other indices of the similarity or dissimilarity of
preference orders affect the likelihood of such outcomes.1 90
1. The Proportion of Single-Peaked Preferences
If, as seen above, complete spectrum agreement in the form of
value-restricted preference profiles absolutely guarantees a transitive
outcome, then, intuitively, one would predict that a large proportion of
single-peaked or otherwise value-restricted preference orders would
increase the probability of an acyclic result, and vice versa. And, as
Richard Niemi proved in 1969, this is precisely the case.19'
Niemi made two findings. First, he found that the incidence of
acyclic results increases with the proportion of individuals in the
profile with single-peaked preferences. 92 Such a result makes
intuitive sense given what is known about complete spectrum
agreement. Second, and more surprisingly, he proved that with some
constant degree of spectrum agreement, the probability of transitive






192. See id. at493.
193. See id. at 493-94.
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Niemi explained, "This means, for example, that if about 70% of the
preference orderings satisfy unidimensional criteria, the occurrence of
the paradox... is relatively likely if the population is small, but is very
unlikely if the population is large."'94
This second result is surprising in light of what we saw before-
the likelihood of transitive outcomes decreased with increasing
numbers of individuals within a neutrally chosen profile. This
incongruity is the result of the two different determinants of the
incidence of transitivity.19  First, there is the low probability of
achieving some level of agreement in a neutrally determined profile.196
Second, there is the effect of that degree of spectrum agreement on the
incidence of transitive outcomes.197 Within any random group of
voters, the probability against getting a large level of spectrum
agreement by chance is so great that it overwhelms the second factor,
so the total probability of intransitivity in a neutrally chosen profile
increases as the number of individuals increases. 198
But within a profile that is not randomly chosen, where there is
some degree of spectrum agreement, Niemi's result is not without
meaning. In a large group with only 70% to 75% spectrum agreement,
the probability of a cycle is rare indeed. Thus "[tihe [voting] paradox
can be very satisfactorily avoided if common frames of reference are
widespread but far less than unanimous."' 99 This general result was
confined by later studies of the effect of social homogeneity on the
probability of transitive outcomes."'
2. Other Measures of Social Homogeneity
There are at least two other indices of social homogeneity. Dean
Jamison and Edward Luce have devised a definition of a coefficient,
sigma (or, more clearly, 1/sigma), indicating the degree of social
homogeneity.2 1 And, like Niemi, they calculate that as 1/sigma
increases (and the degree of social homogeneity increases), so too does
the likelihood of a simple majority winner.02 They also provide a
mathematical method to move from an observation of the probability
194. Id. at 493.




199. Id. at 494.
200. See infra notes 201-206 and accompanying text.
201. See Dean Jamison & Edward Luce, Social Homogeneity and the Probability of
Intransitive Majority Rule, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 79, 86 (1972).
202. See id. at 84-86.
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of intransitivity on a number of issues by a number of different-sized
groups within society to an estimated value of sigma. °3
Peter Fishbum provides evidence that another measure of social
homogeneity, the Kendall-Smith coefficient of concordance, also
provides an accurate prediction of the likelihood of transitive social
preference orderings. 2 4 As to be expected at this point, when the
coefficient of concordance increases, so does the likelihood of acyclic
outcomes.0 5 Thus, by any measure, the greater the degree of social
homogeneity, the greater the probability of a transitive outcome.
The conditions spelled out by Niemi, Luce and Edwards, and
Fishbum, however, are still somewhat restrictive. After all, they
require up to 70% agreement on a spectrum of alternatives. The
occurrence of such agreement is unlikely in modem representative
democracies; the morass of conflicting issue and candidate preferences
in such democracies frustrates any attempt to discern a dimension of
agreement. The number of possible voter-relevant dimensions is quite
large, as one commentator noted:
As voters we are Democrats and Republicans, blacks and whites, males
and females. But we are also hawks and doves, redistributionists and
laissez-faire advocates. We are atheist, agnostic, Catholic, Protestant
Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist, all of various stripes. We are trade
unionists and managers, Main Sireeters and cosmopoles. Some of us
prefer hot, charismatic candidates; others prefer cooler types. Some of
us prefer the well-educated or the well-bred. Others prefer regular Joes
and Joans. The list of our voting-relevant divisions is virtually
endless.206
The natural occurrence of a high degree of spectrum agreement is
unlikely given this multiplicity of personal preferences and social
influences. Voters can and do cross race and party lines for a variety
of reasons. The resultant lack of spectrum agreement increases the
likelihood of intransitive outcomes.
Such diversity, however, is not completely devastating to the
search for transitivity. Remember, we need only find one dimension
that about 70% of the voters agree on in order to drive the probability
of an intransitive result down to near zero. Moreover, each of the three
methods of measuring partial social homogeneity examined thus far-
those of Niemi, Jamison and Luce, and Fishbum-analyzes profiles as
203. Seeid. at81-84.
204. See Peter C. Fishburn, Voter Concordance, Simple Majorities, and Group
Decision Methods, 18 BEHAv. Sci. 364 (1973).
205. See id. at 371-72.
206. Alexander, supra note 53, at 575.
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a sum of their individual preference orders. Might there be another
way to look at preference profiles that lends additional insight to the
problem?
D. Looking at Preference Profiles as a Whole
Several researchers have recently investigated the effects of
looking at preference profiles as a whole in their quest for acyclic
results. Scott Feld and Bernard Grofinan, for example, put forth the
idea of "net preferences."2 7 They showed that intransitive outcomes
were unlikely if one subgroup of individuals in a profile had single-
peaked preferences and the remaining preference orders were
randomly distributed.2 8 The random orders, in effect, cancel each
other out, leaving the single-peaked subgroup to dominate both the
likelihood of a cycle and the social preference order.209 Feld and
Grofman explained, that in the presence of a small subgroup with
value-restricted preferences, "the impartial culture assumption for the
rest of the society, rather than producing generic instability, on the
contrary, guarantees that the relatively coherent minority will prevail
and impose its net preference ordering on the rest of society.""21 There
will not be a cycle since that subgroup has value-restricted preferences,
and the social ordering will be identical to the majority preference
ordering within the subgroup.1
Further, the social preference order will be transitive if one
continuum exists such that the probability that any randomly chosen
individual would align the alternatives along that continuum is greater
than 50%.212 Thus, at least for voters of a large electorate choosing
among relatively few alternatives, if more than half of them agree on a
spectrum, then (because of the canceling out of random preferences),
society's majority choices will be made as if all the members of
society viewed the range of alternatives along the same continuum.
Thus, society may be ideologically consistent even if individuals are
not.2
13
These results were confinned by examining results from the 1980
presidential election.214 In that election, only a bare majority of voters
207. See Feld & Grofinan, supra note 156, at 73-79.
208. Seeid. at75.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 78.
211. Seeid. at75.
212. See id. at 75-76.
213. Seeid. at78.
214. See Feld & Grofrnan, supra note 164, at 780-86.
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had single-peaked preferences, yet 80% of the subsets, and society as a
whole, had single-peaked preferences.215 From that study, Feld and
Grofinan concluded:
The fact that the ideological nature of groups is not a simple function
of the proportion of individuals who have single-peaked preferences
suggests that the sources of ideological orientation must largely be
attributed to tendencies toward ideological perceptions which may be
only dimly realized in any single individual but which may cumulate
across individuals (almost none of whom are perfectly ideological) so
as to consistently provide an ideological cast to the decisions of the
society as a whole and to virtually all of its subgroups.216
Thus society may be more ideological than the individuals that
compose it, and agreement at the aggregate level on a spectrum does
not require a high level of agreement on an individual level.217 Our
inquiry into the conditions that guarantee or increase the likelihood of
transitive social preference orders has been completed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The difficulties posed by Arrow's theorem to voting rights
advocates are not insurmountable. Recent work in the social choice
theory has shown that absolute spectrum agreement is not required to
elude Arrovian difficulties. Instead, increasing degrees of social
homogeneity make transitive outcomes more likely, and there are
some qualities of large groups that make such outcomes almost certain
with relatively low levels of spectrum agreement. _In more precise
terms, 70% to 75% agreement all but ensures a transitive outcome, and
the concept of net preferences lowers the bar even further.
When translated back into the voting rights arena, these recent
advances in social choice theory mean that relatively low levels of
racial bloc voting are necessary to ensure the possibility of a transitive
outcome. Indeed, Gingles and its progeny require a level of bloc
voting that is more than sufficient to the task, and thus provide the
215. See id. at785.
216. Id. at786.
217. One should not be suspicious of this line of argument; it does not posit some sort
of "emergent" group property possessed by none of the group's members. It is instead
dictated by the mathematics of the situation. An example of such an "emergent" property is
that larger groups are more likely to make correct decisions than its members if its members
are more likely than not to be correct Consider what happens, for example, if individuals
make correct decisions 80% of the time. A three-person society composed of such
individuals using a majority vote procedure will make the correct decision almost 90% of the
time, more often than any single individual. Thus, the fact that a society may be more likely
to make meaningful, transitive decisions should not come as a complete surprise.
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degree of spectrum agreement necessary to solve the challenge posed
by Arrow's theorem. They do so, however, without questioning the
viability of the theorem and, because the racial bloc voting in section 2
cases is a form of natural spectrum agreement, without sacrificing the
concerns embodied by Arrow's conditions of democratic fairness.
Such results are important to voting rights advocates in at least
two ways. First they mean that high levels of spectrum agreement in
the form of bloc voting are not required to devise meaningfil vote
dilution standards. Second, the results dispense with the notion that
high degrees of measurement precision are necessary in making claims
of bloc voting. Because the standard has been lowered, relatively large
degrees of imprecision may not doom bloc voting measurements. In
sum, these advances in social choice theory mean that courts can be
assured of finding meaningful qualitative vote dilution standards, and
society can be more confident that courts go about that task in a neutral
manner.
